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MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION. By 
Robert D. Goldstein. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1988. 
Pp. xii, 240. $19.95. 
All human life on the planet is born of woman. The one unifying, incon-
trovertible experience shared by all women and men is that months-long 
period we spent unfolding inside a woman's body. Because young 
humans remain dependent upon nurture for a much longer period than 
other mammals, ... most of us first know both love and disappointment, 
power and tenderness, in the person of a woman. 1 
Mothers are at the center of Robert D. Goldstein's2 book, Mother-
Love and Abortion. Goldstein's premise is that the symbiotic unit of 
mother and fetus - what he calls the "dyad" - is central to the abor-
tion decision because "the fetus and then infant, utterly and helplessly 
dependent, lacks an identity and existence apart from its relationship 
with the mothering one who chooses to care for it" (p. 2). The usual 
terms of the abortion debate, which describe the fetus and the woman 
as entirely separate, 3 ignore that fundamental relationship - and, by 
so doing, fail to explain adequately why one's rights should trump the 
other's. 
Goldstein is anxious to set up an alternative to the individualistic 
rhetoric on both sides of the abortion debate because it "leads to a 
troubling denigration of mother-infant attachment" (p. 3). He seeks 
not only to restore proper respect for the mother-fetus relationship, 
but to provide a more satisfying justification for the pro-choice posi-
tion, based on the premise that "[a]n abortion prohibition would ... 
constitute an exploitation of a woman's mother-love."4 
1. A. RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTIIERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 11 (10th 
anniversary ed. 1986). 
2. Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. 
3. P. 2. The classic example of a pro-choice argument based on the rhetoric of individual 
rights is that ofJudith Jarvis Thomson, which likens the pregnant mother to a kidnapped woman 
forced to be the life-support system for a dying world-class violinist. Thomson, A Defense of 
Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971). Anti-abortion advocates typically start from the 
premise that the fetus has a right to life and then argue for or against an abortion prohibition 
according to their theory of when, if ever, it is morally permissible for one person to take an-
other's life. Thus, for example, some would deny abortion because of fetal innocence, even where 
the mother's life is in jeopardy, arguing that "the right to life protects a person so long as he is 
morally innocent of putting another's life at serious risk." P. 11. Others argue that it is morally 
permissible to preserve one's own life against those who would threaten it, however innocently 
(the fetus as "technical aggressor"). Pp. 11-12. As Goldstein points out, these sorts of argu-
ments refer to the woman and fetus "as if they were living in two separate worlds - except that 
they inhabit the same space." P. 12. 
4. P. x. The relevance and timeliness of Goldstein's inquiry are beyond question. The possi-
bility that the Supreme Court will soon overturn or modify Roe v. Wade has increased even since 
Goldstein's book was published early in 1988. See Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 
F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), cert granted, 109 S. Ct. 780 (1989), argued, 57 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. 
Apr. 26, 1989) (No. 88-605) (involving a Missouri statute, held unconstitutional in the lower 
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Drawing from the insights of political philosophy, feminism, psy-
choanalysis, and infant development, Goldstein provides an absorbing 
account of the mother-fetus relationship and a persuasive alternative 
argument for abortion choice. His critique of the individual rights ap-
proach is utterly convincing. Unfortunately, in what seems an effort 
to depoliticize the abortion debate,5 he lends anti-abortion advocates 
too much credibility and distances himself from some feminist argu-
ments that would advance his position. While he devotes a good deal 
of energy to distinguishing his arguments from the rhetoric of individ-
ual rights, he shies away from direct confrontation with those who use 
the primacy of motherhood to argue against abortion choice. In fail-
ing to distinguish fully his own motherhood ideal from that of his anti-
abortion opponents, he leaves that ideal far too open to its destructive 
potential. · 
I. A PRO-CHOICE ARGUMENT BASED ON MOTHER-LOVE 
Goldstein begins with a discussion of the predominant terms of the 
philosophical and legal debate. According to Goldstein, the philo-
sophical debate concerns two great questions: "When, if ever, does a 
fetus become a person and, accordingly, ... a bearer of a right to life?" 
and "To what does this right, if it exists, entitle the fetus?" (pp. 5-6). 
Goldstein recounts various theories that purport to describe when 
a fetus becomes a person by relying on a number of psychological and 
biological milestones (pp. 6-10). He notes that the placenta, amniotic 
sac, and umbilical cord receive little attention in this literature, "as if 
the individualistic category of personhood directs the attention of reg-
ulator and deregulator alike away from fetal interconnectedness with 
the woman" (p. 10). Even when the interconnection is noted, the wo-
man may be likened to a life-support machine for a critically ill pa-
tient, an analogy that "not only suppresses the woman's existence and 
autonomy, [but] misses the human offspring's indebtedness to and in-
volvement with progenitors, an indebtedness not experienced toward 
machines" (p. 111 n.15). 
As Goldstein rightly points out, it is the second question, regard-
ing what entitlements accompany a fetal right to life, that has required 
more extensive attention from theorists. What duties does that right 
impose on the pregnant woman? Must she preserve the life of the fe-
courts, that severely restricts women's access to legal abortion). Further, whether or not Roe is 
overturned, the way we argue about abortion affects the way we talk about other issues involving 
mothers and children, especially as technology continually changes the legal landscape and 
drives the debate over the "rights" of the fetus, the role of the state, and the rights and obliga-
tions of pregnant women. See pp. viii-ix, 49-52, 165-68. 
5. For example, Goldstein, "(t]o avoid the usual phrases," refers to anti-abortion advocates 
as "regulators" and to pro-choice advocates as "deregulators." P. I. He apparently means to 
distance himself from the heated rhetoric of the traditional debate, attributing the "lack of com-
mon ground" to a masking of shared reality. P. 2; see also infra text following note 22. 
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tus at the expense of her own? Various theories of self-defense have 
been offered: Some argue that the moral innocence of the fetus pre-
cludes abortion even in defense of maternal life, while others view the 
fetus as a "technical aggressor" against whom self-defense is morally 
permissible6 or argue, under the doctrine of double effect, that the wo-
man may incidentally bring about fetal death in a pure effort to save 
her own life (pp. 11-12). Others approach the problem from a differ-
ent angle, focusing on whether the woman can be said to have a "good 
samaritan obligation" to the fetus. Some deny that a good samaritan 
obligation exists at all; 7 others derive the obligation from the woman's 
having engaged in sexual intercourse, thereby intentionally or negli-
gently creating the conditions that placed the fetus in its dependent 
condition. 8 Finally, Goldstein briefly recounts the debate over various 
other proposed exceptions to an abortion prohibition, such as excep-
tions for incest, fetal abnormality, and poverty and other family condi-
tions, along with the anti-abortion allegation that women typically 
have abortions for inconsequential reasons (pp. 18-19). 
Goldstein finds this last claim implausible and, more important, 
notes that "where a woman offers what appears to some as a trivial 
explanation, she is simultaneously expressing one of the weightiest of 
reasons: she does not love the potential within" (p. 19). Here is early 
reinforcement of an important contrast between his view and those of 
traditional advocates: Goldstein places primary importance on the 
mother-fetus relationship and, especially, the commitment that rela-
tionship requires from the mother, while traditional arguments de-
scribe a zero-sum game in which the mother's and fetus' rights are in 
mortal combat. 
Much current legal analysis reflects this atomistic reasoning, 
although the Roe v. Wade 9 regime of choice pits the woman's rights 
not against fetal rights directly but against the state's interest in the 
potential life of the fetus. The controversy over Roe centers on the 
Court's finding that the state's interest is insufficient to trump the wo-
man's fundamental privacy interest until fetal viability.10 Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor's criticism of Roe, in particular, has focused on the 
shortcomings of the trimester approach.11 That approach, according 
6. See supra note 3. 
7. Thomson supports this argument by noting that "no state in this country [compels] any 
man •.. by Jaw to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan to any person •... " Thomson, supra 
note 3, at 63. , 
8. Pp. 12-18. Those arguing for a rape exception counter that no obligation exists where the 
woman has not voluntarily undertaken the responsibilities resulting from intercourse. 
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10. P. 23. For synopses of the criticisms of Roe, see G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
517-49 (11th ed. 1985); G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 119-22 (F. Schauer rev. 11th ed. 
Supp. 1988); W. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
483-508 (1986). > 
11. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 
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to Justice O'Connor, is "on a collision course with itself"12 because of 
technological developments that are gradually moving the date of via-
bility back into the second trimester. O'Connor appears to believe 
that the impending collapse of the trimester approach will erode Roe's 
balancing of interests altogether: she argues that the viability ap-
proach was arbitrary to begin with, and that there is no logical point 
other than the beginning of pregnancy at which to assume that the 
state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling.13 
Goldstein finds the potential results of O'Connor's approach quite 
troubling. If the state interest were to be deemed compelling at con-
ception, the state could regulate abortion throughout pregnancy sub-
ject only to the minimal requirement that regulations bear a rational 
relationship to protecting potential life (pp. 26-27). O'Connor, he be-
lieves, might even accept a return to the pre-Roe days of an absolute 
abortion prohibition, "[with] that former regime's exceedingly troub-
ling procedural and equality problems" (pp. 27-28). Most disturbing 
to Goldstein is the prospect that "if technology were to eclipse Roe's 
trimester system, it could ... create the conditions ... for a regime not 
of abortion but of elective separation and fetal incubation in the hospi-
tal," a regime which the commentary on Roe increasingly sees as an 
alternative.14 Goldstein's desire to avoid this "technological 
nightmare" (p. 31), with its attendant prospects for denigrating 
mother-fetus attachment, fuels his efforts to find an alternative justifi-
cation for abortion choice. 
Goldstein attempts to replace the rights-based categories of tradi-
tional abortion rhetoric with an approach that adequately accounts for 
"the constitutive attachments within and through which fetuses be-
come ... rights-bearing citizens" (p. 34). He places this effort in the 
context of recent work by political philosophers, feminists, and devel-
opmental psychologists who have attempted to "locate the person 
within his or her relationships in a preexisting community" (p. 34). 
The mother-and-fetus dyad is the "primary community" here, and 
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecol· 
ogists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
12. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458. 
13. 462 U.S. at 461. In light of a comprehensive review of the medical literature (pp. 24-26, 
129-38), Goldstein refutes O'Connor's conclusions as "overly eager and unappreciative of the 
biological limitations on the current technology"; his reading of this literature suggests that 
"Roe's trimester scheme remains robust." P. 25. Even assuming that O'Connor's factual as-
sumptions someday prove correct, most abortion decisions made today (usually in the first tri· 
mester) would continue to be protected. P. 26. Moreover, Goldstein sees the trimester approach 
as more functionally than factually correct: it is simply "a convenient way to think about the 
outcome of the balance that Roe struck" (p. 138 n.64) between the state's interest in fetal life and 
the woman's right to a reasonable period of choice. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
14. Pp. 29-30. Goldstein cites, for example, the following commentaries: G. CALABRESI, 
IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITTIJDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC 
LAW PROBLEM 113, 198-99 n.396 (1985); B. NATHANSON & R. OSTLING, ABORTING AMERICA 
282-83 (1979); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 297-98 (1975). 
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Goldstein attempts to describe the mother and fetus in relation to each 
other15 and to the larger communities with which they interact.16 
Unlike any other kind of interdependence that law might recog-
nize, "respect for the nature of the fetus-infant requires recognition of 
the dyadic unit of which it is a fused part" (p. 54). The fetus needs 
more than "privacy," "the right of the individual to be let alone"; 17 it 
needs "a personal and prolonged devotion of care amounting to love" 
(p. 54). And the law of abortion choice, according to Goldstein, is not 
about the right of the woman herself to be let alone, or simply a matter 
of bodily autonomy; it protects "the right to determine whether she 
will enter into a physical and emotional symbiosis with the fetus-infant 
and, more generally, into a love relationship of parenting."18 
The state interest in regulating abortion has generally been defined 
as an interest in protecting potential life. But Goldstein wisely encour-
ages serious thinking about the nature of that interest: Is it the kind of 
interest that the government can further through coercion? Through 
divorce restrictions, the state formerly compelled people to stay mar-
ried, although it could not compel husbands and wives to love each 
other (pp. 57-58). But putting aside the inhumanity of forcing people 
to stay in personal relationships, unhappy husbands and wives can sur-
vive without love by finding nurturance elsewhere; as Goldstein notes, 
infants do not have such strength and flexibility. Without the care 
they need, they may grow weak in mind and body. Some may die, 
while others who appear to survive may suffer inside or grow up to 
"inflict the lovelessness of their origins on others" (p. 58). 
The state "cannot assure the survival and growth of infants any 
more than it can command good poetry. There must be an intervening 
15. In Goldstein's terms, this means exploring the fetus' dependence on the mother, as well 
as what the relationship requires of the mother: "[This] method must ... explain what maternity 
requires of a woman, and inquire into the conditions under which she may appropriately provide 
what is needed." P. 34; see also p. x. Goldstein is only partially successful at achieving this goal. 
See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
16. "Since membership in a family and citizenship in the state are determined primarily by 
who, having once been part of her same body, emerges from the womb of one of the women 
members, the questions of abortion and communal membership are closely linked." Pp. 34-35; 
cf. supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
Goldstein derives his theory of the mother-fetus relationship from the object-relations school 
of psychoanalysis. He describes at length how the experience of treating severe pathologies led 
analysts to conclude that the child's first symbiotic relationship with its mother is essential to 
psychological health. Pp. 40-47, 149-62. In fact, for some patients, traditional psychotherapy is 
unavailing; the patient can only be reached by attempting to recreate in the analytic setting that 
earliest mother-infant relationship. Pp. 45-46. Goldstein's description of the analyst's provision 
of "primary love" (p. 46) is powerfully suggestive of the sacrifice of motherhood; he concludes 
that "[o]ur particular individuality exists because ..• some caregiver, sufficiently unambivalent, 
chose to care for us and merge with us and let us merge with her." P. 47 (footnote omitted). 
17. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RE.v. 193, 205 (1890). 
18. P. 54; cf. p. 46 (the analyst's provision of primary love requires her "full consent and 
participation," while the patient "takes for granted the extreme efforts of the analyst to meet his 
needs"). 
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act of human grace and creativity" (p. 58). Of course, not every child 
who would have been aborted will be abused, neglected, or harmed-
many, if not most, women care for the children they are compelled to 
bear. 19 But if the state decides to force women to nurture their unborn 
children, it will be using its power to exploit mothers, not to protect 
potential life. That power is the mother's alone (p. 59). 
Since the woman's right, as defined by Goldstein, is to decide 
whether to commit herself to the mothering relationship - to make a 
"procreative decision" on behalf of the dyad (p. 59) - he portrays 
Roe's fetal viability standard as serving primarily to establish ~ reason-
able period in which the woman can make that choice. Goldstein ar-
gues that, while the first trimester affords a sufficient period of choice 
for the overwhelming majority of women,20 a longer period encom-
passing the second trimester is necessary to assure that the state does 
not unjustly discriminate against certain women in its protection of 
the mother-right.21 
Goldstein urges those who have difficulty accepting the woman as 
the appropriate decision maker to take comfort in the interpersonal 
decisionmaking process that Roe set up (pp. 79-85). Even if the physi-
cian-patient dialogue the Court envisioned does not take place, the wo-
man makes her decision in a social context that inhibits her ability to 
make an isolated decision based solely on her personal needs. More-
over, studies of abortion decision making suggest that women can and 
do engage in inner dialogue to examine what is best for the dyadic 
unit.22 
II. MASKED REALITIES 
Goldstein's book is motivated by a sense that the current abortion 
debate has denied and masked an important reality: "the centrality to 
human existence of mother-love and the love for the mother" (p. 2). 
He suggests that "[a]n unmasking [of shared realities] might facilitate 
a reclamation of shared understandings among ongoing disputants" 
(p. 2). Yet in his effort to facilitate this reconciliation, Goldstein does 
19. In a strictly legal sense, women are not currently compelled to bear unwanted children; 
Roe v. Wade makes abortion choice a constitutional right. In reality, however, the state does not 
assure women this right: for women who are indigent, for example, abortion may not be an 
option. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (the right to privacy does not require that 
Medicaid fund medically necessary abortions); see also C. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: 
Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 92, IOI (1987) ("The women in Harris . .• 
needed something to make their privacy effective."). Women may also feel compelled to bear 
unwanted children because of spousal or societal pressure against abortion. 
20. More than 90% of all abortions occur within the first trimester. Pp. 60, 174-75 n.59. 
21. See pp. 60-62 (some women, such as the very young, the emotionally stressed, the poor, 
the poorly educated, and women with irregular menses, may be unable to make a procreative 
decision until the second trimester). 
22. P. 86; see, e.g., Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Moral-
ity, 47 HARV. Eouc. REv. 481, 489-509 (1977). 
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some masking of his own, covering over some of the hard realities of 
women's lives that contribute to the fear and anger many women feel 
at the threat of losing abortion choice. 
A. The Reality of Sex 
Some anti-abortion advocates see themselves, much like Goldstein 
sees himself, as offering an alternative to the atomistic individual 
rights rhetoric of pro-choice advocates. They base their argument on 
sex: the pregnant woman, because she has freely engaged in sexual 
intercourse, owes a duty to her fetus that she would not owe to a fa-
mous violinist to whom she had been hooked up as life support.23 
Goldstein responds by noting that this argument implies that "what 
the offspring needs the woman can simply be coerced to give" (p. 33). 
Bqt this response is not enough; an.ti-abortion advocates might argue 
that they, unlike pro-choice advocates, do recognize a special relation-
ship between m9ther and fetus -, a relationship they would simply 
characterize differently than would Goldstein. 
Goldstein's response is to argue for a more realistic characteriza-
tion of women's e4perience:, a ~egitimate good samaritan duty for 
pregnant women toward their fetuses is not possible without "an ac-
ceptable theory of the nature, rights, and obligations of sexuality" (pp. 
14-15). However, he gives the problem only passing attention, simply 
outlining his view of what such a theory would look like: 
(1) It would have to "justify, in light of a long history of abuse, 
the resulting double standard in which the burdens of procreation 
are imposed substantially on women." 
(2) "It should acknowledge the instinctuality that makes sexual-
ity driven and the natural and necessary, contribution sexuality 
makes to intimate association, personal identity, and the pleasure 
of life." , 
(3) It should "distinguish contraception from abortion." 
(4) It oug4t to account for "a woman's different knowledge and 
capacities for consent to intercourse and procreation at different 
stages of her life." 
(5) It should "excise the punitive motivation of those who would 
exploit and use children by treating them as a means to punish 
sexually active women .... " (p. 15.) 
While the concerns on Goldstein's wish list are. valid, his cursory 
treatment leaves them open to dismissal. For example, many anti-
abortion advocates have justified unequal imposition of the burdens of 
23. The violinist analogy is derived from Judith Jarvis Thomson's celebrated defense of abor-
tion choice. See supra note 3. For a pro-choice argument that Thomson's analogy is misframed, 
see C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 98-99 ("No woman who needs an abortion - no woman, 
period - is valued, no potential a woman's life might hold is cherished, like a gender-neutral 
famous violinist's unencumbered possibilities. The problems of gender are thus underlined here 
rather than solved, or even addressed."). 
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procreation by pointing to the special role of motherhood. The idea is 
that men and women are "intrinsically different," that "men are best 
suited to the public world of work, and women are best suited to rear 
children, manage homes, and love and care for husbands. "24 It is only 
fitting, under this view, that women should bear the burdens of child-
rearing; men have other work to do. Additionally, anti-abortion advo-
cates might dismiss Goldstein's list on the grounds that none of his 
concerns matter compared to the value of human life (that is, the fe-
tus' life),25 especially since the place of some of the items on his list is 
neither explained nor readily apparent. 
Moreover, Goldstein's wish list only partially accounts for the real-
ity of sex for women. It is not enough, for example, to argue that the 
motive for each act of intercourse does not always, or even often, in-
clude a "deep, complex, and realistic wish for and commitment to a 
child" (p. 57) - the woman's motive may not even have been to en-
gage in sexual intercourse. Setting aside the question of rape as tradi-
tionally perceived26 or even as legally defined,27 sex in this society, as 
Catharine MacKinnon has aptly explained, takes place under condi-
tions of gender inequality. Society - and the law - tell women that 
their motives are unimportant: 
Feminism has found that women feel compelled to preserve the appear-
ance - which, acted upon, becomes the reality - of male direction of 
sexual expression .... [This] is much of what men want in a woman .... 
Rape ... is adjudicated not according to the power or force that the man 
wields, but according to the indices of intimacy between the parties. The 
more intimate you are with your accused rapist, the less likely a court is 
to find that what happened to you was rape. . . . If "no" can be taken as 
"yes," how free can "yes" be?28 
Goldstein's list suggests that problems of "consent to intercourse 
and procreation" are all a matter of age and ability to understand im-
plications (p. 15). But more and better statutory rape laws will not 
24. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLmCS OF MOTHERHOOD 159·60 (1984) (exploring 
the differing world views of abortion activists). This, of course, raises the issue of how easily 
Goldstein's motherhood ideal can be perverted. See supra notes 43·68 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., K. LUKER, supra note 24, at 161 (abortion is "intrinsically wrong because it 
takes a human life"); J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVEN· 
TIES 171 (1979) ("the liberty of abortion ... consists in a freedom to knife, poison, starve, or 
choke a human being"). 
26. This is rape committed by "the armed stranger jumping from the bushes." S. EsTR1cH, 
REAL RAPE 8 (1987). 
27. "A man commits rape when he engages in intercourse ..• with a woman not his wife; by 
force or threat of force; against her will and without her consent." Id. 
28. C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 95; see also MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 650 (1983) [hereinafter 
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence]: 
Women are socialized to passive receptivity ...• Sexual intercourse may be deeply un-
wanted - the woman would never have initiated it - yet no force may be present ••• , If 
sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less whether there was force and 
more whether consent is a meaningful concept. 
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solve the problem of women's lack of power over their sexual lives. 
Sixteen-year-old girls may or may not be especially helpless, but "they 
- and women as a group - are systematically dominated by men as a 
group."29 Statutory rape laws may then be part of our society's ten-
dency to pretend that "sexual intercourse is normally equal."30 
Disappointingly, Goldstein summarily dismisses these arguments: 
The "strong claim" that "heterosexual intercourse under patriarchy 
may not be deemed the free will of the woman ... does not and will 
not win broad assent .... "(pp. 13-14). Why the controversial nature 
of these feminist arguments justifies ignoring them is unexplained -
unless they are simply too politically loaded to fit into Goldstein's con-
ciliatory effort. His dismissal of such an important aspect of feminist 
theory, in contrast to his generally respectful attitude toward women, 
calls into question his commitment to "explain what maternity re-
quires of a woman" (p. 34); surely the burdens of mothering are exac-
erbated where children are conceived under conditions of female 
powerlessness and ambivalence. 31 The societal belief that good sex 
"just happens" - at the direction of the man32 - inhibits women 
from t~king control over their sexual encounters. A woman may feel 
unable even to interrupt sex to insert a diaphragm, 33 much less expr~ss 
a wish not to have sex at all. Under these conditions, finding out she is 
pregnant may tum the woman's confusion and ambivalence into de-
spair. Whether the man stands by her or not, the woman is faced with 
a range of socially weighted choices: abortion, suicide, adoption, 34 or 
rearing a child alone. 3s 
Goldstein appears to miss the ways in which the feminist construc-
tion of sexuality might support his arguments for a reasonable period 
of choice. MacKinnon's "strong claim" in fact leads to the same con-
clusion that Goldstein reaches in concern for the dyad: that the wo-
29. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 387, 
428 (1984). 
30. Id. Olsen's article contains an interesting analysis of the ways in which statutory rape 
laws may both help and hurt women. Id. at 401-32. 
31. See generally A. RICH, supra note 1, at 11-12, 256-80. Rich notes that "where women 
always entered heterosexual intercourse willingly ... there would be no 'abortion issue.' And in 
such a society there would be a vast diminishment of female self-hatred - a psychic source of 
many unwanted pregnancies." Id. at 269. 
32. See text accompanying note 28. 
33. MacKinnon notes that women often do not use birth control because "[u]sing contracep-
tion means acknowledging and planning the possibility of intercourse, accepting one's sexual 
availability, and appearing nonspontaneous." C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 95. But "[s]ex 
doesn't look a whole lot like freedom when it appears normatively less costly for women to risk 
[abortion,] an undesired, often painful, traumatic, dangerous, sometimes illegal, and potentially 
life-threatening procedure than to protect themselves in advance." Id. 
34. Goldstein's book contains a valuable discussion of the sacrificial love required of women 
who give their children up for adoption after the nine-month-long nurturing relationship of preg-
nancy. See pp. 63-70. 
35. See A. RICH, supra note l, at 12. 
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man is the relevant decisionmaker regarding abortion. In a world in 
which women do not control the conditions of sex - or of mother-
ing36 - what women really need is for the state to assure them a real 
choice in the matter. 37 The various proposed exceptions to an abor-
tion prohibition38 are therefore problematic: If the state cannot be 
trusted to determine when a woman has been raped,39 it likewise can-
not be trusted to determine when the conditions of her pregnancy jus-
tify the choice of abortion. Thus, Goldstein's view that the state is not 
in a position to make a decision on behalf of the fetus is bolstered by 
the feminist argument that the state is not in a position to make a 
decision on behalf of the woman - and yet he ignores this argument. 
To the extent that our sensibilities are offended by the prospect of 
late abortions (because the woman has, inadvertently or otherwise, 
fostered the fetus-infant's reliance on her care), Goldstein's arguments 
against denying women second-trimester abortions suggest that the 
humane solution is not to prohibit later abortions entirely, but to em-
power women to choose early in their pregnancies.40 Likewise, femi-
nists suggest that if society is worried about women using abortion as 
contraception, it ought to make adequate and accessible contraception 
a "genuine social priority."41 Here again, feminist explorations of wo-
men's lack of control over sexuality reinforce Goldstein's arguments: 
If the state is concerned about the wisdom of women's abortion deci-
sions, it must empower them to make wise decisions, not make their 
36. See Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342, 343-44 (1980). 
37. MacKinnon argues that the privacy 'doctrine as construed in the abortion decisions fails 
to secure real reproductive choice for women because it reaffirms and reinforces the public/ 
private split, in which personal and family choices are considered completely separable from the 
public world of work and government. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 19; Olsen, The 
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
The liberal ideal of privacy operates on the assumption that, as long as the public sphere does not 
intrude, autonomous individuals interact freely and equally in the private sphere. "In this view, 
no act of ~he state contributes to - hence should properly participate in - shaping the internal 
alignments of the private or distributing its internal forces." C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 
99-100. Thus, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." See supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text. But in practice, "letting women alone" very often leaves them without reproductive 
choice. The right of privacy then ends up being "a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress 
women one at a time." C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 102. Goldstein criticizes the tradi-
tional conception of privacy as similarly insensitive to the needs of the fetus. See supra text 
accompanying notes 17 & 18. 
38. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
39. No one expresses this better than MacKinnon: 
Most women get the message that the law against rape is virtually unenforceable as applied 
to them .... [W]e have not "really" been raped if we have ever seen or dated or slept with or 
been married to the man, if we were fashionably dressed or are not provably virgin, if we are 
prostitutes, if we put up with it or tried to get it over with ..•. Even women who know we 
have been raped do not believe that the legal system will see it the way we do. We are often 
not wrong. 
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 28, at 651. 
40. Pp. 59-62, 176-77 n.62. 
41. A. RICH, supra note 1, at 269. For a discussion of the ways in which society discourages 
women from using contraception, see supra note 33. 
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decisions for them. 42 
B. The Reality of Motherhood 
In order to "accord[] the pregnant woman a privileged position as 
dyadic representative," Goldstein says he must claim "a privileged sta-
tus for biological motherhood in human procreation" (p. 65). He de-
rives this status, in part, from "the reinforcing sqpport of the religious, 
mythological, and group-psychological history of our culture, which 
creates special maternal meanings ... and commits women (as it com-
mits men) to certain social uses" (p. 65). But these meanings have 
been oppressive to women, 11$ revealed by the uses to which they have 
put women as compared to men.43 If Goldstein's view requires that 
we enshrine the historical meanings of motherhood, ahortion rights 
will depend on the continuance of gender oppressfori. Goldstein never 
sufficiently defines these meanings to account for tltjs possibility, nor 
does he distinguish his motherhood ideal from that of the anti-abor-
tion movement. 
Goldstein's insensitivity to this problem is evident on m!lnY fronts. 
For instance, he identifies the 1973 Supreme Court as a champion of 
an "integrated and whole view of motherhood," which he says "is con-
sistent with the idea of 'mother' that, as a general matter in health, we 
tend to hold - and hold our mothers to."44 This "integrated and 
whole view" identifies the burdens of pregnancy and child care as "a 
unitary concept" (p. 66), inevitably interconnected. But if these are 
the meanings to which Goldstein is hearkening, his theory is very dan-
gerous indeed. The burdens of pregnancy and child care are tied to-
gether in this society - but not toward an integrated and whole view 
of motherhood. This sacred calling of patriarchy - women's "natural 
role,"45 - has required women to remain "essentially unquestioning 
and unenlightened"46 and rendered them largely powerless to control 
the conditions in which their children grow.47 As Sara Ruddick has 
explained, "Children confront and rely upon a powerful maternal 
presence only to watch her become the powerless woman in front of 
the father, the teacher, the doctor, the judge, the landlord - the 
42. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
43. A good introduction to this history, should one be needed, can be found in A. RICH, 
supra note 1. 
44. P. 66 (footnote omitted). MacK.innon has a somewhat different interpretation of what 
the Supreme Court had in mind in Roe: "Reproduction is sexual, men control sexuality, and the 
state supports the interest of men as a group .... [Abortion was legalized because] the interests of 
men as a social group converged with the definition of justice embodied in law in what I call the 
male point of view." C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 97. 
45. See, e.g., K. LUKER, supra note 24, at 160-63 (anti-abortion activists believe that the 
traditional emotional and social division of labor is both "appropriate ·and natural"). 
46. A. RICH, supra note 1, at 43. 
47. Ruddick, supra note 36, at 343. 
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world."48 
Our culture idealizes the stresses of mothering as if they were inev-
itable. 49 But in reality, a mother's unavoidable powerlessness against 
the dangers of illness and death is exacerbated by "avoidable social 
powerlessness,"50 which Adrienne Rich eloquently describes: 
[T]he absence of social benefits for mothers; the inadequacy of child-care 
facilities in most parts of the world; the unequal pay women receive as 
wage-earners, forcing them often into dependence on a man; the solitary 
confinement of "full-time motherhood"; the token nature of fatherhood, 
which gives a man rights and privileges over children toward whom he 
assumes minimal responsibility; ... the burden of emotional work borne 
by women in the family - all these are connecting fibers of this invisible 
institution [of motherhood] .... 51 
Much of the selflessness required of mothers is imposed not by 
their children but by a society that, for all its talk of the glories of 
motherhood, doesn't give mothers much help. 52 The sufferings of 
poor women are particularly heartbreaking: "The state makes it easier 
for a mother on welfare to obtain a sterilization than to keep warm in 
winter, find child care, or provide nourishing meals for her chil-
dren. "53 If we hold to the societal myth that motherhood is not a 
matter of choice, but is a high calling imposed on women by natural 
law and physiology, then we can rest easy; these problems are not our 
concern. But then we are left to wonder whether we can trust women 
to their "mere unaided virtue" (p. 73). What about aiding their vir-
tue? If we want women to choose to be mothers, then we must take 
some responsibility for why women get abortions, and make it easier 
for them to choose motherhood. This would require a true reverence 
for what mothers do, and a collective recognition of responsibility for 
minimizing the sacrifices of motherhood since, as Goldstein points 
out, "[t]he larger community's interest in the next generation is real-
ized through the woman's decision ... to bear her child" (p. x). 
Of course, motherhood as traditionally perceived is not without its 
joys - the love and trust of one's child, the feeling of accomplishment 
that comes with nurturing her growth, the shared pleasure with other 
women, the gratitude and pride of one's mate.54 Nor is it without 
utility: as Goldstein points out, it does assure the child that someone 
will make his care a primary concern (p. 66). But at what cost? Gold-
stein worries that analyzing too closely why motherhood deserves a 
48. Id. 
49. A. RICH, supra note 1, at 276. 
50. Ruddick, supra note 36, at 343. 
51. A. RICH, supra note l, at 276-77. 
52. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
53. T. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL PoLmcs: WOMEN, STERILIZATION, AND REPRO• 
DUCTIVE CHOICE 189 (1985). 
54. See Ruddick, supra note 36, at 344; cf. infra note 68. 
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privileged position will somehow induce "a mistaken belief that one 
can immediately constitute an alternative system that would equally 
assure offspring a continuity of committed care" (p. 197 n.91). But 
such statements suggest that he, like anti-abortion activists, is ulti-
mately concerned about the interests of offspring, regardless of the 
costs to women. At the very least, he is shutting his eyes to the dan-
gers of his view. Some rethinking of society's view of motherhood is 
surely necessary, and is well within Goldstein's reach. 
Goldstein's few attempts to deal with this problem are unsatisfy-
ing. He claims at one point not to be idealizing motherhood at all, 
noting that "it is exceedingly hard and often unrewarding work" (p. 
69), yet his appeal to broad cultural meanings contradicts this claim. 55 
He criticizes the substantial disparity of the pre-Roe regime's imposi-
tion of good samaritan duties on women as compared to men (pp. 15, 
28), yet fails to note that in many people's minds, this is part of the 
glory of motherhood. 56 
Moreover, Goldstein's attempts to anticipate anti-abortion opposi-
tion to his appeal are infected with a tendency to build bridges at inap-
propriate times. His characterization of abortion clinic protestors as 
attempting to "represent" the silent fetus in the decision-making pro-
cess and to "encourage" the woman's "generative potential" (p. 87) 
glosses over the violence of their intrusions on women's private pain 
and the broader, more troublirig implications of their appeals to the 
ideal of motherhood. 57 He blandly characterizes those who worry that 
no line can be drawn between abortion and infanticide58 as seeking to 
deny or repress "human ambivalence." Goldstein's response is dispas-
sionate: the most sensible way to deal with ambivalence is to give peo-
ple a reasonable period in which to make a decision, and then to hold 
them to that decision. After all, "there does not appear to be a sub-
stantial basis for crediting the anxiety that maternal hostility is so un-
controlled and so without affirmative and counterbalancing love as to 
require the most rigid repression" (p. 71 ). 
Goldstein's gentlemanly response to infanticide alarmists again ob-
scures the oppressiveness of their appeal to the motherhood ideal: The 
idea that motherhood means "absolute dedication to each and every 
55. P. 65. Idealizing motherhood need not mean claiming that it is all rewards and no work. 
In fact, the traditional ideal of motherhood speaks vaguely of its ''joys and pains" - without 
questioning the origin of the "pains." A. RICH, supra note 1, at 276. 
56. See id. at 43, 168-69. 
57. See, e.g., K. LUKER, supra note 24, at 163 ("pro-life people .•. see tenderness, morality, 
caring, emotionality, and self-sacrifice as the exclusive province of women; and if women cease to 
be traditional women, who will do the caring, who will offer the tenderness?"); J. NOONAN, supra 
note 25, at 190 (the exercise of abortion liberty is "a betrayal of the most paradigmatic of trusts, 
that which entrusts to a mother the life of her helpless child"). 
58. Abortion and infanticide are said to be indistinguishable under the view that motherhood 
must mean "absolute dedication to each and every child." P. 71 (quoting 3 B. HARING, THE 
LAW OF CHRIST 209 (1966)). 
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child" has made many mothers feel like failures. 59 He also obscures 
the misogyny and matriphobia inherent in their arguments. The im-
plication is that women cannot be trusted with abortion choice be-
cause we fear they are not as selfless as we expect mothers to be - in 
other words, the motherhood ideal of complete selflessness is suppos-
edly "natural," yet it must be enforced. Thus, on the one hand, wo-
men are the villains of the abortion debate because they are violating 
their true nature, refusing to embrace their sacred role, and, on the 
other hand, Surgeon General Everett Koop has asked, as if the answer 
were self-evident, "I wonder how many of us would be here today if 
someone had the option of not feeding us as newborns?"60 
Such rhetoric reflects a deep societal ambivalence stemming from 
the realization that each of us has been dependent on women for our 
very existence. Adrienne Rich has noted that "[t]here is much to sug-
gest that the male mind has always been haunted by the force of the 
idea of dependence on a woman for life itself, the son's constant effort 
to assimilate, compensate for, or deny the fact the he is 'of woman 
born.' "61 Sara Ruddick traces the problem to the conjunction of ma-
ternal power and powerlessness: "A child's rageful disappointment in 
its powerless mother, combined with resentment and fear of her pow-
erful will, may account for the matriphobia so widespread in our soci-
ety as to seem normal."62 One way of dealing with this fear and 
resentment is to tell women - as does the anti-abortion movement -
"You owe life to your children," just as we tell our mothers, "You owe 
us unconditional love. "63 
59. The burden of maternal guilt plagues women, who feel they can never measure up to the 
ideal: "Am I doing what is right? Am I doing enough? Am I doing too much?" A. RICH, supra 
note 1, at 223. Recalling her days as the mother of three small children, Adrienne Rich remem· 
bers being "haunted by the stereotype of the mother whose love is 'unconditional' •.•. " Id. at 
23. She recounts a conversation about this with her now-adult son, who marveled that "You 
seemed to feel ·you ought to love us all the time. But there is no human relationship where you 
love the other person at evecy moment." Rich explained to her son that "women - above all, 
mothers - have been supposed to love that way." Id. 
60. P. 71 (quoting Koop, The Road to Auschwitz, in R. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CON· 
SCIENCE OF THE NATION 59 (1984)). 
61. A. RICH, supra note 1, at 11. Rich notes that we know less about the effect on culture of 
this realization among women, since women have had less control over the makings of patriar-
chal culture. Id. 
62. Ruddick, supra note,36, a.t 343. 
63. The trial court opinion in the Baby M "surrogate mother" case is a stunning example of 
the motherhood ideal's' potential to betray women. Macy Beth Whitehead undertook the surro-
gate mothering contract out of a desire to "[give] the most loving gift of happiness to an unfortu· 
nate couple," ~d then found that she could not bear the thought of giving up her child. In re 
Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1142 (N.J. Super. 1987). In her battle to keep the child, she naively 
argued that she ought to win custody because, after all, she was the child's mother. 525 A.2d at 
1147. And what mother would not die rather than entrust the care of her child to a stranger? 
Nevertheless, the trial court repeatedly characterized her behavior as obsessive, and terminated 
her parental rights. 525 A.2d at 1151-56, 1167-70. "Mrs. Whitehead loved her children too 
much ...• Too much Jove can smother a child's independence." 525 A.2d at 1168. In the words 
of the appellate court {which affirmed the ruling of custody to the father but overruled the termi· 
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The distrust of women that lies behind arguments that they should 
be denied abortion choice represents society's unwillingness to accept 
responsibility for the oppressive conditions of motherhood. In ex-
treme cases, these conditions drive women to violence. Adrienne Rich 
has recounted the example of Joanne Michulski, whose muffied pleas 
for help in dealing with the stresses of raising eight children, basically 
without the support of her husband, were ignored until she slaugh-
tered her two youngest children with a butcher knife. 64 The newspa-
pers speculated after the fact that the incident was the result of a 
failure of county mental health services. But Rich wonders if the real 
problem is that the expectations laid on Joanne Michulski and count-
less other mothers are "insane." "Instead of recognizing the institu-
tional violence of patriarchal motherhood, society labels those women 
who finally erupt in violence as psychopathological."65 If the mother-
hood ideal of complete selflessness is "natural," women like Joanne 
Michulski are simply freaks of nature. Their failures do not implicate 
us in any way. 
Goldstein never admits that anti-abortion advocates idealize moth-
erhood, and because he does not go to any real lengths to distinguish 
his motherhood ideal from theirs, one cannot know how such idealiza-
tion can lead to two such different results. Are Goldstein and the anti-
abortion activists simply reaching different conclusions from the same 
ideal, or is there a difference in the content of Goldstein's ideal that 
leads him to argue for, not against, abortion choice? 
One can read Mother-Love and Abortion to favor a motherhood 
ideal that is more respectful of women, particularly since Goldstein 
recognizes throughout that the sacrificial love required of mothers 
means that society cannot force this commitment on women. Such a 
recognition is integral to an alternative motherhood ideal, as is an ap-
preciation of the miracle that so many women do choose to make sac-
rifices for their children, even in this imperfect society. 66 The ideal 
should also account more satisfactorily for the place of fathers in the 
lives of their children. 67 And it should treat motherhood as not just a 
nation of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights), "[A] perfectly fit mother was expected to surrender 
her newly born infant, perhaps forever, and was then told she was a bad mother because she did 
not." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 459, 537 A.2d 1227, 1259 (1988). That was what "uncondi-
tional love" required of this mother. 
64. A. RICH, supra note 1, at 256-58. 
65. Id. at 263; see also id. at 277-78. 
66. Cf p. 59 ("many women, although not all, tend to care for the children they are com-
pelled to bear"). Sara Ruddick has taken heart in the fact that, "despite the inevitable trials and 
social conditions of motherhood, [mothers] are often effective in their work." Ruddick, supra 
note 36, at 344. 
67. Ruddick's vision of this is particularly compelling: 
On that day, there will be no more "Fathers," no more people of either sex who have power 
over their children's lives and moral authority in their children's world, though they do not 
do the work of attentive love. There will be mothers of both sexes who live out a trans-
formed maternal thought in communities that share parental care - practically, emotion-
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selfless act, but as a commitment to a relationship that optimally ought 
to benefit the mother as well as the child. 68 
Goldstein defends his alternative argument for abortion choice on 
the grounds that it better accounts for the unique meanings of preg-
nancy, birth, and infant care. "Whether such meanings are biological, 
psychological, or cultural in origin, and whether they are natural or 
imposed, they appear to exist. Our society, for the social end of repro-
duction, reinforces and exploits - and therefore ought to respect -
these meanings" (p. 70). But if society "exploits" these meanings, 
what would they look like unexploited? Goldstein never answers this 
question. He fails to realize that, for women's reproductive freedom to 
be truly secure, the meanings themselves must be questioned and re-
claimed. The motherhood ideal must be consciously rethought in a 
way that accords women genuine respect and explicitly rejects the 
view that women owe mother-love to society by natural law. One can 
only hope that Mother-Love and Abortion will provide impetus for that 
project. 
- Darleen Darnall 
ally, economically, and socially. Such communities will have learned from their mothers 
how to value children's lives. 
Id. at 362; see also A. RICH, supra note 1, at 216-17. 
68. Ruddick hearkens to the pleasures of motherhood - the sense of well·being and compe· 
tence when one's children flourish, of pride in the function of one's reproductive processes -
which manage to survive even in a "relatively indecent society." Ruddick, supra note 36, at 344. 
In a more decent society, women (and men) could take real pleasure in these rewards of mother· 
ing rather than being driven by guilt that they are not "doing enough." See supra note 59. 
